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Abstract
The criteria for a learner’s understanding the words of a language include acting appro-
priately. In the case of Anscombean modals (e.g., ‘You have to j’), these actions include 
whatever is specified in the modal statement (e.g., j-ing). Teaching language means instill-
ing not just abilities, but inclinations, to do certain things. With non-learners there is a 
default presumption of linguistic competence, and this explains how an adult can be said 
to understand ‘You have to j’ while being generally disinclined to respond appropriately, 
i.e., by j-ing. (Dishonesty.) It’s possible for it to become normal for the members of some 
societal group to fail to respond appropriately to modal statements; such a situation may 
be one of conceptual and practical confusion, with the sort of corresponding bad faith 
alleged by Anscombe in connection with the ‘moral ought’. Since understanding modal 
statements is manifested in forms of voluntary action, the internalist view that one only 
has reason to obey a rule if doing so is conducive to the satisfaction of one’s desires turns 
out to be incoherent.
Keywords: Anscombe; Wittgenstein; stopping modals; language; rules; internalism
Resum. Significat, comprensió i acció 
Els criteris perquè un estudiant entengui les paraules d’un idioma inclouen actuar de 
manera apropiada. En el cas de la lògica modal d’Anscombe (p. ex. Haver de j), aques-
tes accions inclouen el que s’especifica en la declaració modal (p. ex. gerundi-gerundi). 
Ensenyar un idioma significa inculcar no només habilitats sinó també inclinacions per fer 
certes coses. En el cas dels no estudiants, existeix una presumpció predeterminada de com-
petència lingüística, i això explica que es pugui dir que un adult comprèn «Ha de» mentre 
que generalment no està disposat a respondre adequadament, és a dir, fent j-gerundi. 
(Deshonestedat.) És possible que es consideri normal que els membres d’algun grup social 
no responguin adequadament a les declaracions modals. Aquesta situació pot ser resultat 
d’una confusió conceptual i pràctica, amb el tipus de mala fe corresponent al·legada per 
Anscombe en relació amb el «deure moral». Atès que la comprensió de les declaracions 
modals es manifesta en formes d’acció voluntària, resulta incoherent la visió internalista 
que un només té raons per obeir una regla si fer-ho és propici per satisfer els desitjos. 
Paraules clau: Anscombe; Wittgenstein; modals d’interrupció; llenguatge; regles; inter-
nalisme
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1. Understanding stopping and forcing modals
When does a child count as understanding the meaning of ‘plus’? Roughly 
speaking, when she has sufficiently mastered the skill of addition; in other 
words, when she often enough uses ‘plus’ (‘+’) in the right way, where that 
especially means: doing correct calculations employing the symbol. ‘Often 
enough’ is of course vague. We encounter the same vagueness when faced with 
the question, ‘When can a child play the piano?’ Answer: when she sufficient-
ly often gets things sufficiently right on the piano (playing scales, pieces, etc.).
There is a general point here about language-mastery. As Wittgenstein 
famously wrote: ‘For a large class of cases…in which we employ the word 
“meaning” it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the lan-
guage’ (PI 43).1 Using a word is a form of activity. To characterise the use of 
a word, one will often need to locate that use within a certain language-game, 
i.e., a rule-governed practice in which various words or expressions are used 
in interlocking ways. The term ‘rule-governed’ here points to the difference 
between correct and incorrect uses of words. Understanding a word means 
having the ability to use it correctly, often enough.
Although all word use may be called ‘activity’, involving various kinds of 
actions (assertion, questioning, exclamation, apology…), there are certain uses 
of words which are bound up with action in a very direct way. I have in mind 
two kinds of language-game: that involving imperatives, and that involving 
what Anscombe calls stopping and forcing modals. When does a child count 
as understanding the meaning of such imperative forms as ‘Come here’, ‘Pass 
the butter’ or ‘Don’t do that’? The natural answer is: ‘When she responds 
appropriately often enough.’ And ‘responding appropriately’ presumably 
means obeying or complying with the command or request. (Perhaps we 
should additionally require that she develop the ability to use imperatives 
herself.)
Stopping and forcing modals are linguistic cousins of imperatives. Ans-
combe introduces them in the course of explicating, and then jumping free of, 
a certain circularity that we are liable to encounter when we try to say what a 
promise is (see, e.g., Anscombe, 1981a, 1981d). To say what a promise is, we 
need at least to say this: that if you promise to j, you bring it about that you 
1. I will refer to Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations (Wittgenstein, 1958) as ‘PI’; unless 
otherwise specified, numbers refer to the numbered sections of Part I of that work.
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have to j. But what does ‘have to’ mean? Is it this: that you have to j, or you’ll 
upset the other person? But you might not upset them; they might never even 
discover that you broke the promise. Moreover, perhaps I would upset some-
one to whom I’d expressed an intention (to be at a meeting, say) if I changed 
my mind and didn’t do what I said I’d do; but that fact wouldn’t turn my 
expression of intention into a promise. How about this: you have to j, because 
if you don’t you’ll commit a wrong? But how shall we say what the ‘wrong’ is, 
except by calling it ‘breaking a promise’? (A circle.) So is it this: you have to 
j if you wish to obey the Rule of Promising? But what is the rule? Isn’t it: If 
you promise to j, you have to j? (Another circle.) We still haven’t explained 
this ‘have to’.
Anscombe notes that we will be unable to solve this problem so long as we 
attempt to give non-circular analyses of such expressions as ‘promise’ and ‘have 
to’ (or of sentences employing them). She proposes that we instead look to 
how these words are used, and especially to how they are taught and learnt. 
This is what she does; and her investigation yields a number of findings, one 
of which concerns the difference between mere imperatives, such as ‘Move 
your king’, and statements like ‘You have to move your king’. The meaning 
and function of the latter, she points out, is bound up with another kind of 
statement, which she calls a logos; the logos might for example be ‘Your king 
is in check’. In the case of promising, ‘You promised to do X’ would be a logos 
for ‘You have to do X’, and the meanings of these two statements cannot be 
understood independently of one another. They must be learnt together as 
part of a package deal. 
‘Stopping/forcing modal’ and ‘logos’ are technical terms, for which Ans-
combe does not give explicit definitions, reasonably enough. Should we take the 
characteristic just mentioned, of there being a mutual conceptual dependence 
between logoi and their correlative modal statements, as definitive of logoi? It 
seems not. For you could, e.g., take some already-grasped concept and stipulate 
that this concept is to have the reason-giving force of a logos in the game you 
are inventing or explaining. ‘Everyone dances around and when the music stops, 
you have to sit on a chair if you can.’ This rule yields such statements as ‘You 
have to sit down – the music has stopped!’ Clearly, we understand the mean-
ing of ‘The music has stopped’ independently of learning the rule. Neverthe-
less, it can be said that one learns a new role for ‘The music has stopped’, and 
understanding this role is indeed tied up with understanding the meaning of 
‘You have to sit down’.
When does a child count as understanding the meaning of the modal, ‘You 
have to’ (‘You’re meant to’, etc.)? She needs to be able to ask or answer the 
question ‘Why?’; if asked it, she’ll need to be able to give a logos, for instance 
by saying ‘Your king is in check’. If ‘You have to’ is addressed to the child and 
an appropriate logos is given, then presumably she’ll need to respond appro-
priately often enough if she is to count as having mastered this bit of language. 
As with imperatives, ‘responding appropriately’ means doing the thing which 
she ‘has to’ do.
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Normal adults understand imperatives and understand stopping/forcing 
modals. They were taught the use of these expressions as children and have 
not forgotten how to use them. So if understanding is a matter of ‘responding 
appropriately’, can we infer that any normal adult will typically, or even quite 
often, obey authoritative commands, comply with requests, keep promises… 
and generally speaking not break the rules? Would that it were so! What, then, 
is the difference between my not understanding the rules of poker and my 
cheating at poker? What is the difference between my failing to grasp that I 
should keep a promise and my simply ignoring the obligation which I have 
put myself under?
The significance of such questions is at once conceptual and ethical. (Phi-
losophy and ethics are continuous.) The ethical aspect of the issue can be seen 
in the fact that someone’s not understanding a rule will typically excuse his 
breaking it; in many cases we might even decide that such inadvertent 
rule-breaking isn’t rule-breaking at all, strictly speaking. I say ‘typically excuse’ 
because a lack of understanding of this sort isn’t always taken to be exculpa-
tory: see, for instance, the legal principle that ignorance of the law is no 
defence (ignorantia juris non excusat). Ignorance here includes not understand-
ing. But when the rule or rules in question go to constitute a practice, as chess 
is constituted by its rules, the ‘wrong’ committed by one who breaks a rule 
cannot be understood independently of the existence of the rule;2 it was this 
fact which threatened circularity in our account of promises, a circularity 
Anscombe avoided by invoking the learning and use of modals and logoi. The 
law against murder, by contrast, forbids something which is independently 
wrong or wicked, and here at least the rationale for the above-mentioned legal 
principle is pretty clear. But the inadvertent breaking of constitutive rules is 
surely prima facie excusable. This is in part due to the conventionality (arbi-
trariness, one might say) of the forms specified or assumed by the rules - e.g., 
the shape of a given chess piece, or the actions that embody the donation of 
something to someone. One who is unaware, or not fully aware, of the signif-
icance of these conventional forms doesn’t thereby show a bad character.
In everyday life there are straightforward criteria for determining if some-
one knew he was meant to j, although he didn’t j. If he knew he was meant 
to j, he of course understood the relevant formula, ‘You’re meant to j’; so 
these criteria are also criteria for his understanding the formula. Here are some 
examples. If caught out, the person might admit he’d broken the rule; or if 
put on the spot and asked, ‘Now what were you meant to do?’ he might just 
tell us. Or again, we might have witnessed him readily following the rule in 
other circumstances; or – often noteworthy – he might have insisted on others’ 
following the rule, been aggrieved when they didn’t do so, and so on.
2. A practice like promising is necessary for the attainment of important human goods, as 
Anscombe argues, so the wrong involved in breaking a promise is not merely that of 
breaking some rule or other. 
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Equally, there are everyday criteria for someone’s not understanding a rule, 
or not knowing about it, or not knowing that it applied in a given situation. 
If he is still a learner, that itself is a fact with criterial weight. If an adult, then 
sincere expressions of surprise when we berate him for not j-ing will indicate 
a lack of knowledge or understanding. Or he might have suffered a stroke with 
consequent amnesia. Et cetera.
With language-mastery in general, the default position is that a person 
above a certain age and of normal intelligence will understand the words he is 
using, or which others use when talking to him.3 This default position is not 
something that we adopt for pragmatic or epistemic reasons; it is not, e.g., 
based on inductive assessments of the probability of someone’s understanding 
something. (The past ‘evidence’ for such an assessment would have to include 
a great deal of unquestioned linguistic intercourse – unquestioned because the 
default position is that people know what their words mean!) Rather, the nature 
of this default position is similar to that described by Anscombe in her article, 
‘On Brute Facts’ (Anscombe, 1981b).
In ‘On Brute Facts’, Anscombe discusses the move from certain premises 
to a conclusion like ‘X owes Y £10’. (The premises could include ‘X ordered 
potatoes from Y’, ‘Y delivered a sack of potatoes’, etc.) For this human practice 
to be possible (= practicable), moves or inferences of this sort must be 
allowed to stand in the absence of defeating circumstances; that is to say, if 
certain facts hold, the default position is that X owes money to Y. Defeating 
circumstances are circumstances such as: that half the potatoes were rotten; 
that the bag was left two miles from X’s house; that X and Y were both acting 
in a film. It is not possible in advance to state exhaustively what may count as 
defeating circumstances – again, not for ‘pragmatic reasons’, but rather because 
of the fluid and creative nature of human institutions, and because of the 
‘imponderable evidence’ on which we so often rely in our dealings with our 
fellow human beings.4 
For linguistic intercourse to be possible (= practicable), it is likewise nec-
essary that a person is taken to be ‘playing the language-game’ in the absence 
of defeating circumstances. And this is obviously so for the sorts of lan-
guage-games I’ve been alluding to, such as that of promising. Earlier, I men-
tioned two sets of criteria, those for determining understanding and those for 
determining lack of understanding, and it is in fact the second of these which 
is going to be more pertinent to our question, ‘What is the difference between 
3. We should perhaps add that the person ‘belongs to the linguistic community’, since no one 
will understand what’s said in an unfamiliar language. But to belong to a linguistic com-
munity is simply to understand a whole lot of words and expressions (as speaker, reader, 
audience…); so the ‘default position’ I’m referring to is not adopted prior to talking and 
listening to someone, but itself crystallises in those moments during which one’s interacti-
on with the person enables one, through a host of contextual and other ‘clues’, to proceed 
automatically in one’s dealings with them as with a speaker of English (French/Catalan/
Hindi…). 
4. The phrase is Wittgenstein’s; see PI, II xi, p. 228.
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my failing to grasp that I should keep a promise and my simply ignoring the 
obligation which I have put myself under?’ If you are an adult of normal 
intelligence, and you say ‘I promise I’ll take you to the airport’, then your 
subsequent protestation that you didn’t know what promises were will not be 
allowed any weight unless you can plausibly cite some (rather extraordinary) 
circumstance, capable of defeating the default assumption of linguistic com-
petence.5 It is not for us to invoke criteria of understanding, it is for you to 
invoke criteria of non-understanding.
It is tempting to ‘look inwards’ here in the manner of Descartes and insist 
that whatever I did and said, and whatever the external circumstances, my 
understanding of my own words, or lack of it, is a purely internal – perhaps 
even private – matter. I will not here rehearse the critique of the Cartesian 
picture which we find in the later Wittgenstein, beyond saying this: insofar as 
the desire to ‘look inwards’ arises from the recognition that it can always turn 
out that someone didn’t after all understand what he was saying (e.g.), this 
latter fact is central to, and accounted for by, the picture adumbrated above, 
with its reference to default positions, criteria and defeasibility.
2. Abilities and inclinations
Teaching language means teaching abilities – in other words, training. The 
bare notion of an ability or skill differs from that of an ethical virtue, in a way 
delineated by Aristotle (and later by Aquinas). An ethical virtue like honesty 
involves not just the ability to give a customer the correct change (say), but 
the desire or inclination to do so. By contrast, being good at spelling amounts, 
roughly, to being able to spell words correctly if you want to. For this reason, 
misspelling a word on purpose doesn’t impugn your skill as a speller in the 
way that misspelling it inadvertently does; whereas walking off with someone 
else’s wallet on purpose impugns your claim to be honest while walking off 
with it accidentally does not.
When we teach a child the use and meaning of modals like ‘You have to’ 
and ‘You cannot’, we aim to bring it about that the child regularly forms the 
inclination to j when he has understood that he ‘has to’ j. Indeed, as was said 
above, it would seem to be a criterion of his understanding the modal that he 
responds appropriately, i.e., voluntarily js, often enough. Thus, in teaching this 
bit of language, we are not imparting a mere ability, if that means the ability to 
do X if one wants to (to do X being to j in response to ‘You have to j’). We are 
aiming to impart a readiness or inclination to do certain things. A child who 
never responds appropriately to ‘You have to j’ may be said not to have mas-
tered the language game at all; one who responds appropriately but not often 
enough will either be deficient in understanding or deficient in will – which of 
these it is will depend on whether, and to what extent, we can appeal to the 
5. As is hinted in footnote 3, the term ‘assumption’ is not a psychological one. Shared ‘assump-
tions’ are manifest in human procedures.
Meaning, Understanding and Action Enrahonar 64, 2020  27
sort of criteria of (non-)understanding discussed earlier. What I have called 
deficiency in will might, depending on the case, strike us as deficiency in virtue 
(naughtiness), or slowness to acquire virtue, or some such. We will be more 
likely to talk of imperfect virtue where the case is that of the modals governing 
the promising language game than where it is that of the modals governing the 
playing of chess. Deficiency in will as regards playing by the rules in chess 
would look like boredom, or contrariness, or whim. (Which is not to say that 
these phenomena lie outside ‘the ethical’.)
In fact the teaching of language quite generally aims to instil more than 
just the ability to use words correctly. It is not enough that the learner can 
give the correct answer to ‘a + b = ?’ when he wants to; he also needs to be 
someone who generally does want to give the correct answer, in the sense that 
this is his default inclination: he is not someone who quite often feels like 
giving an incorrect answer, for instance. Indeed, as we have seen, a person 
will only count as understanding the meaning of ‘plus’ if he often enough 
gives the correct answer, so that it is rather hard to coherently depict a child 
who can give the correct answer when he wants to but can’t be relied on to 
want to. (It is somewhat easier if we are depicting an adult.) In the case of 
imperatives and stopping/forcing modals, however, the voluntary actions 
which we desire to see the language learner performing are not just linguistic 
actions, i.e., uses of the very words which it’s to be hoped the learner is learn-
ing – the voluntary actions we desire to see the learner performing are those 
ordered or required, i.e., those mentioned in the imperative or modal state-
ment. The idea of deficiency of will has a ready application to those who don’t 
do what they have to, or don’t do what they’re told: human motives for 
non-compliance or disobedience are often perfectly natural, flowing from our 
human nature.6 Motives for misusing words are not in this sense humanly 
natural; quite a lot of scene-setting and circumstantial detail are needed to 
depict a scenario in which the diagnosis ‘He wants to use that word wrong’ 
has any appeal.
The person who has properly learnt the meaning and use of ‘You have to 
j’ will be disposed to j in response to that statement, ceteris paribus. That last 
phrase is intended to cover such defeaters as: recognition that the statement 
was a joke, recognition of pressing reasons not to j, recognition that no suit-
able logos is forthcoming, and so on. In the extreme case, a reflective adult 
may find reason to reject the very practice constituted by the rules in question. 
Absent such rational rejection, the person, as I have said, will be inclined (dis-
posed) to act in accordance with the statement: the actions they consequently 
perform will be voluntary and intentional. Anscombe foregrounded an agent’s 
actual or possible responses to ‘Why?’ as indicative of intention or the lack of 
6. And of course we mustn’t forget the frequently imperfect behaviour of parents towards their 
children, including in the context of teaching or training; a child’s resistance or ‘naughtiness’ 
might be a form of self-protection, or expressive of a craving for love, or any number of 
things – rather than straightforward ‘deficiency’. 
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it (see Anscombe, 1963); and here the question, ‘Why are you j-ing?’ gets its 
answer courtesy of the language-game itself. For the agent will be able to reply 
using the relevant logos – for example, ‘Because I promised to’.
The adult who has fallen into the habit of lying, cheating or breaking 
promises does not (as I have argued) have the excuse of non-understanding 
ready to hand. In the absence of defeaters, the presumption of competence 
stands, and our diagnosis will be one of ‘deficiency of will’ – which does not 
mean weakness of will, but rather a defective orientation of the will (a wrong 
ordering of priorities, weighing of practical reasons, etc.). The ordinary word 
for such a person is ‘dishonest’. Such a person knows what ‘You cannot’ and 
‘You have to’ mean; and indeed the bare ability to play the language-game may 
be alluded to by some such remark as, ‘He knows well enough how to keep 
an undertaking if he wishes to impress the boss’. He can do X if he wants to. 
It’s just that too often he doesn’t want to.
But this last fact will indicate that such linguistic training as he received in 
childhood did not achieve its true aim. For the aim of teaching a child the 
modals ‘You have to’, etc. is precisely to instil a standing inclination to 
‘respond appropriately’ to them. The language games in question, after all, 
have a human point, they play a real role in our lives. The aim of the teaching 
was not to instil a mere ability. So although we do say of the dishonest adult 
that he understands what it is to make a promise, answer a question truthful-
ly, etc., we can in the same breath say that he has not learnt what society was, 
in a sense, trying to teach him.
3. Illusion and confusion
This reference to what society is ‘up to’ should not be thought of as ruling out 
the possibility that society, or social groups, should themselves fall into habits 
of dishonesty. In a certain sense, it can become the norm – or at any rate 
become normal – for people to break the rules, or twist the rules, for ulterior 
motives, conscious or unconscious. The more this happens, however, the clos-
er we get to a state of linguistic and practical confusion. The meanings of 
words become unfocused; people’s accounts of what they are doing become 
detached from their real, more or less unconscious aims. This kind of confu-
sion is a species of conceptual corruption.
What shows that a prevalent use of a term or set of terms involves, not 
merely false beliefs, but confusion? The answer is: the tangles, dead ends, 
contradictions, empty statements and even plain nonsense into which such 
use leads people. Where the use of the terms in question is bound up with 
action, people’s behaviour may show a corresponding incoherence: its signif-
icance will often be obscure, including to the agents themselves.
In ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’, Anscombe famously argued that ‘the con-
cepts of obligation, and duty – moral obligation and moral duty, that is to say 
– and of what is morally right and wrong, and of the moral sense of “ought”, 
ought to be jettisoned if this is psychologically possible; because they are sur-
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vivals, or derivatives from survivals, from an earlier conception of ethics which 
no longer generally survives, and are only harmful without it’ (Anscombe, 
1981c: 26). If she was right, a way of using the word ‘moral’ had become 
prevalent, and this way of using it should be jettisoned. But if meaning is use, 
how can this be? If people are prevalently using a word a certain way, the word 
surely has a meaning; and the only available criticism of anyone who uses the 
word thus will surely be that they have said something false. The use of the word 
can’t itself be criticised. So it might be argued.
It is a natural line of argument, and it might seem to follow from the idea 
expressed by Wittgenstein when he wrote: ‘If language is to be a means of 
communication there must be agreement not only in definitions but also 
(queer as this may sound) in judgments’ (PI 242). But of course Wittgenstein 
is here stating a necessary, not a sufficient, condition of language’s being a 
means of communication. There might be prevalent agreement that such-and-
such is ‘morally obligatory’, although the expression ‘morally obligatory’ is in 
truth devoid of real sense, and no genuine communication is achieved by 
means of it. This is precisely the picture which Anscombe paints for us. The 
‘prevalent use’ turns out to be prevalent nonsense. In virtue of what?7
One key aspect of the use of ‘moral obligation’, ‘morally ought’, etc., as 
depicted by Anscombe is that all sorts of reasons for doing something are 
rejected as inadequate. Reasons that cite what is needed (e.g., for a human 
being’s health), or that cite established rules or customs, or that cite commands 
– none of these, it is alleged, touch the important issue, which is: What action 
am I morally obliged to do? For can’t I always ask, ‘But ought I to aim for what 
is needed, or what is dictated by rules, or what is commanded?’. Now it is true 
that one often can ask some such further question, especially about commands, 
for instance. But a general dissatisfaction with all ‘factual’ reasons raises the 
question: What can ‘I ought to j’ amount to, if there can be no substantive 
reasons that fully support that judgement? The result of not accepting any 
substantive reasons as adequate answers to ‘Why ought I to do that?’ is to make 
that question futile and empty - and also that particular use of ‘ought’. I am 
not suggesting that every instance of the question ‘Why ought I to do that?’ 
will in fact have a substantive answer, for explanations run out somewhere and 
no answer can be given to one who asks, ‘Why ought I to treat matchsticks as 
less valuable (more dispensable) than human beings?’ The criteria determining 
what are good, bad, intelligible or unintelligible answers to the question ‘Why?’, 
in the context of a particular kind of enquiry, cannot themselves be interrogat-
ed by that question; and the fact that enquiry is a sort of social practice involv-
ing human beings gives a clue as to why the quoted question is a senseless 
attempt to interrogate such criteria. And it is worth noting that nothing would 
be achieved – or even said – by making out that there is simply a moral obliga-
tion to treat matchsticks as less valuable than human beings.
7. What follows is both a condensation and an elaboration of what Anscombe says about this 
in ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’. (Not as paradoxical as it sounds.)
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‘You have to give reasons why lemurs (or matchsticks) ought to be treated 
as less valuable than human beings: we need grounds for this alleged moral 
obligation’; ‘You tell me that it would be dishonest to do this, but is there a 
moral obligation to be honest?’ In such statements, as characteristically used, 
the phrase ‘moral obligation’ does no real work. We felt as if we were saying 
something important when in reality we were saying nothing. For we in a sense 
forgot the point of certain language games, e.g., those in which reasons for 
action are asked for or given.
Anscombe connected her account of the prevalent use of ‘moral obliga-
tion’, ‘morally ought’, etc. with a diagnosis: aspects of that use are explicable 
by reference to an earlier belief system, one involving divine commands. 
Without this belief system, she argued, an expression like ‘ought’ – used in 
the way she was depicting – had ‘become a word of mere mesmeric force’ 
(ibid., 32). But it should be noted that Anscombe’s genealogical diagnosis is 
optional. The important thing is the futility of what people are doing with 
language, a futility which they themselves do not recognise.8 To quote Witt-
genstein again: ‘a wheel that can be turned though nothing else moves with 
it, is not part of the mechanism’ (PI 271). What is interesting is that there 
can be a widespread illusion that a wheel is part of the mechanism which in 
fact isn’t part of the mechanism. If all this is correct, Anscombe’s view does 
not stand or fall with the genealogical diagnosis (in terms of the earlier belief 
system): her description of use is what is crucial. And the use of these words 
is bound up with how people act. The problem is thus not a ‘merely’ theo-
retical one – it is also a practical one. Indeed, Anscombe’s main motive for 
critiquing the confused use of ‘moral obligation’, etc. is that this use natural-
ly leads to, or lends itself to, people’s abandoning considerations of (in)justice 
in favour of considerations of what is expedient, in the context of actual 
practical deliberations.9
Futility will evidently infect language games involving stopping and forcing 
modals if it becomes normal to respond with indifference to ‘You’re meant to’, 
‘You can’t’, etc. The futility might not go unrecognised, in which case the 
language-game in question is liable to become a shell of its former self, or 
simply die out. This may well be true of various forms of etiquette, for exam-
ple. But we should remember that etiquette blends with morality. If the prev-
alent response to ‘You wronged X, so you should apologise to X’ (logos fol-
lowed by modal statement10) comes to be one of indifference, i.e., if the 
 8. ‘Prevalent’ does not mean ‘universal’. Anscombe clearly did allow that someone who calls 
such-and-such ‘morally obligatory’ might mean something quite intelligible – as, that not 
doing such-and-such would be unjust, would wrong somebody. This would come out in 
what further things the person said (or did), e.g., by way of explanation.
 9. See Anscombe (1981c: 38-42; from ‘I will end by describing…’ to the end of the article).
10. ‘You wronged X’ and ‘You should apologise to X’ are not learnt as part of a ‘package deal’, 
in the way in which ‘It’s mine’ and ‘You can’t take it’ are. While the concept of apology is 
dependent on that of wronging someone (viz. the person to whom apology is owed, typi-
cally), the reverse doesn’t hold – particularly in view of the fact that ‘wronged X’ is an 
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act-type apologising becomes sufficiently rarely instantiated, then the status of 
‘You should apologise’ will approach that of the wheel that can be turned 
though nothing else moves with it. In the beginning is the deed, in the end is 
nonchalance.
Illusion that a wheel is part of the mechanism when in fact it isn’t attends 
the situation in which ‘You’re meant to’ comes to be used as if there were logoi 
to back it up, or (more specifically) comes to be backed up by ersatz logoi. The 
language of rights often seems to involve this species of illusion/confusion, as 
when ‘I’ve a right to such-and-such’ gets backed up by a more or less arbitrary 
logos – as it might be, ‘Other people who are no better than I am have such-
and-such’. The purpose of the linguistic move is to seem to be playing a trump 
card when one has no trump card to play. This is most likely a subconscious 
or unconscious purpose, however, and the person proclaiming his right might 
feel genuinely aggrieved if it is not respected. The continuation of this state of 
affairs is made possible by (among other things) the attractiveness of certain 
roles: occupier of the moral high ground; person with a complaint; person 
deserving of our sympathy; person to whom airtime and limelight are owed. 
Whether this particular phenomenon is sufficiently widespread as to merit the 
soubriquet ‘conceptual corruption’ is an empirical matter, one that is beyond 
the scope of this essay. But it is hard to deny that public discourse offers many 
instances of the sort of thing I am talking about: language being used for 
ulterior motives, as we might put it. 
4. Travails of internalism
A person who has properly learnt the meanings of stopping/forcing modals, I 
have argued, is someone who is not merely able, but inclined, to ‘respond 
appropriately’ to their use, ceteris paribus. The picture of human agency which 
emerges from this is at odds with a popular philosophical position, viz. ‘inter-
nalism’ about reasons for acting.11
For an internalist, a person can have reasons for j-ing only if j-ing is 
somehow conducive to the satisfaction of that person’s desires. (Obviously this 
formula can be tweaked in various ways, according to the version of internal-
ism in question.) Let’s imagine that you and I are playing chess, and you 
threaten my king with your rook. Perhaps observing my hesitation, you say, 
‘You have to move your king, it’s in check’ – forcing modal followed by logos. 
According to what I’ve been arguing, the following is true: if I have properly 
learnt12 the meaning of forcing modals, know the rules of chess, and see no 
abstraction from such particular cases as ‘insulted X’, ‘maimed X’, etc. But this doesn’t 
prevent our calling ‘You wronged X’ a logos. The case is like the one earlier alluded to: ‘The 
music has stopped, so you have to sit down’.
11. See, e.g., Williams (1981), Smith (1987).
12. For the sense of this phrase, see the concluding paragraph of sect. 2: you won’t have pro-
perly learnt the meaning and use of modals if you have failed to acquire, or have lost, a 
standing inclination to respond appropriately to them.
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defeating circumstances in view, then I will move my king, unless somehow 
prevented from doing so. My action will be intentional – I will be ready with 
a reason if asked, ‘Why did you do that?’, my reason being ‘My king was 
threatened’. At this point, an internalist may say either or both of two things: 
(a) neither the statement ‘You have to move your king’ nor the statement ‘Your 
king is in check’ nor the conjunction of the statements can, in itself, give me 
a reason for moving my king; (b) the circumstance that I don’t want to move 
my king (or: play by the rules) is in a trivial sense a possible defeater, since if 
I don’t want this, I have no reason to move my king.
Taking (a) first, we might start by asking, ‘If that isn’t a reason for action, 
what is?’ But this sort of appeal to common sense is likely to be shrugged off. 
A more direct attack is to ask the internalist what sort of meaning and use can 
be ascribed to ‘You have to j’. The answer is liable to be that such a formula 
is either merely factual or merely imperatival: it is thought that each of these 
options leaves room for the rational agent to treat or not to treat the formula 
as supplying a reason, according to her own subjective preferences.
‘Factual’ indicates some claim along the following lines: ‘You have to move 
your king’ means ‘By the rules of chess, any move here other than moving your 
king is not a genuine chess move’. The claim fails for at least two reasons. First, 
the rules of chess do not simply state what actions shall be called ‘chess moves’, 
something that can be seen in the distinction between breaking a chess rule 
and doing something other than moving. By the rules of chess, scratching one’s 
head is not called a ‘chess move’, but if I scratch my head I haven’t thereby 
broken a rule of chess.13 Second, the rules of chess in fact include such rules 
as that you have to move or defend your king when it is threatened.14 So the 
proffered explanation of ‘You have to move your king’ is viciously circular by 
virtue of its mention of ‘the rules of chess’. 
As for the claim that ‘You have to j’ is a mere imperative, we have already 
seen that this is mistaken. Forcing modals differ from imperatives in being 
conceptually tied to logoi. And it is significant that it is a logos that I am 
likely to give as my reason when asked ‘Why did you do that?’
13. It might be said that the rules of chess are silent as to whether scratching one’s head is called 
a ‘chess move’. Independently existing rules of word use are what preclude calling scratching 
one’s head a ‘chess move’. - The phrase ‘independently existing’ is suspect, since the concept 
chess move only exists once the rules of chess exist. But in any case, the rules of chess are 
(pace the position under discussion) quite generally silent about word use. Calling a legal 
move of the white king a ‘chess move’ is not prescribed by the rules of chess. In teaching a 
human being the rules of chess, we do indeed introduce words, e.g., by saying, ‘This 
[pointing] is the white king’. But (a) we are not thereby stating a rule of chess, as the pre-
sence of the demonstrative shows, and (b) we don’t, and couldn’t, introduce ‘chess move’ 
in such a way. You learn what ‘chess move’ means by learning how to play chess – or by 
learning the concept move in the context of other games and learning that there’s a game 
called ‘chess’ in connection with which that concept is used.
14. That is to say, if you can do so without breaking another rule; if you can’t, you’re check-
mated. This mention, within a rule, of other rules of the game aptly illustrates how the 
rules of a practice must be learnt as a ‘package deal’.
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What about (b), above? In response to your statement ‘You have to move 
your king; it’s in check’, I say, ‘Ah no; you see, I don’t want to move my king.’ 
Do I mention a defeating circumstance, in the sense in which the grocer’s 
leaving a bag of potatoes two miles from my house is a defeating circumstance 
relative to both ‘He delivered the potatoes’ and ‘I owe him £10’? Clearly not. 
What count as ‘defeating circumstances’ is determined by the practicalities of 
the given practice and (thus) of its attendant language-game; in general – though 
not always – an agent’s mere lack of inclination to abide by one of the rules 
constitutive of a practice cannot be taken as, and so is not, an adequate reason 
for their not abiding by it.
It is often a truism to say that someone will only do something if she wants 
to. If I don’t want to move my king I won’t do so; ditto, if I want not to move 
it.15 But these truisms give no support to internalism about reasons for acting. 
What people do and what people want can after all be unreasonable, even 
irrational. And it is often the rules of a practice that determine what rational-
ity and irrationality amount to.
Consider language use itself. Language is governed by rules: you can’t call 
that a ‘fox’ (it’s a flamingo), you’re meant to say ‘Yes’ (if that’s the answer), you 
may call this shade ‘blue’ (or ‘green’). Here are Anscombe’s modals in play.16 
A philosopher says, ‘I have no reason to j unless I want to’. Being sincere, she 
takes herself to be saying something true. Whether it’s true depends on what, 
e.g., the word ‘want’ means in her statement. Could she say: ‘I want to use 
this word in conformity with the rules governing its use – so I will’? But how 
is she using the word ‘want’ in that statement? That she uses words in con-
formity with the rules is a presupposition of her saying anything at all; she 
cannot decide to use words correctly, since the content of any such decision 
will already have committed her to the ‘aim’ of using words correctly. And yet 
following rules is, for the internalist, something one only has reason to do if 
doing so fits in with one’s desires. 
Could the philosopher perhaps think, ‘I want to use the word “want” in 
conformity with the rules governing its use – so I will’? If she thinks the thought 
in English, the same argument will apply as above. If she thinks it in a private 
language – putting aside conceivable qualms about such a notion – she must 
still take it as moot whether she wants to abide by the rules of this private 
language, including the rule governing ‘I want’. (You are to take both occur-
15. The truism shouldn’t be taken as a universal truth; after all, ordinary usage certainly allows 
‘I did what I had to, though I really didn’t want to.’
16. A child first learns to use words correctly and only later learns the meaning of such a for-
mula as ‘You can’t say that (use that word here, etc.)’. Language is rule-governed, though 
its speakers don’t need to have such concepts as ‘rule’, ‘have to’ or ‘cannot’ in order to count 
as linguistically competent. There must, however, exist practices of correcting and confir-
ming within a linguistic community, and a community in which articulate reflection upon 
such practices is possible will be one in which Anscombean modals (or equivalents) get 
used. What of the logoi to be used in conjunction with these modals? These are very vari-
ous in kind; some enjoy a conceptual interdependence with their correlative modal state-
ments (‘You can’t call him Mark, his name is Max’), and some do not.
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rences of (inflexions of ) ‘want’ in the previous sentence as standing proxy for 
putatively private symbols.) So the same argument goes through: for her to 
say that she does want to abide by that rule involves positing a certain decision 
as a rational prerequisite of itself – a nonsense. 
 If pushed to its logical conclusion, internalism about reasons for acting 
thus appears to result in a commitment to the ineffability of a certain kind of 
‘mental content’. An internalist must cite the desire to follow linguistic rules 
as that which gives the speaker reason to follow those rules, in the sense that 
if he lacks such a desire his breaking the rules cannot be deemed irrational 
(hence subject to criticism); and the content of this desire must be regarded 
as being determined independently of all rule-governed meaning. For the 
internalist conceives of a person as ‘equipped’ with some standing desires, in 
light of which he will have reason to do some things and not others – and 
these desires will have to include the desire to use ‘desire’ in conformity with 
linguistic rules, public or private. But he cannot express, to himself or to oth-
ers, the content of this desire (the one with which he is already equipped). To 
do so, he would have to have already made the decision (to use ‘desire’…) 
which we are envisaging him as now rationally making. In fact, the identity 
of the standing desire must float free of all norms, public or private.17 In which 
case it is hard to see how it could be compatible or incompatible with anything 
at all. ‘So in the end when one is doing philosophy one gets to the point where 
one would like just to emit an inarticulate sound’ (PI 261). Moreover, in any 
actual context of philosophical debate real words must be utilised. Ineffable 
thoughts are not on the table.
So how should we think about the matter? We imagined the philosopher 
saying, ‘I have no reason to j unless I want to’. The question we face – that 
which flummoxed the internalist – is: ‘Did she have a reason for using the word 
“want” in accordance with the linguistic rules that govern it?’ In other words: 
‘Why did she use the word “want” in accordance with the linguistic rules that 
govern it?’ Now the question ‘Why?’, in its reason-demanding sense, is sus-
ceptible of a large variety of kinds of answers. Such answers typically depend 
on what the person asking the question is after. Does he have in mind some 
reason why it would be a good idea to break the linguistic rules in this situa-
tion? (Perhaps he takes it that the speaker is, in fact, attempting to illustrate 
certain common misuses of words.) In the absence of some such explanation 
for his enquiry, it is not clear what sort of answer can be given, unless it be 
‘There’s no reason to break the rules here’. If that is allowed as a positive 
answer to ‘Why?’, then we may say that the speaker intentionally conformed 
to the linguistic rules when she spoke. But it is an odd saying. The facts are: 
17. An internalist who is content with a third-personal, behaviouristic conception of desire 
might embrace the ideas of norm-free desire and of norm-free practical rationality. A per-
son desiring to follow linguistic rules would on this account simply be, in effect, one who 
did in fact (often) conform to those rules, as a calculator might be said to conform to 
arithmetical rules. Apart from anything else, this view makes no room for that asymmetry 
between linguistic competence and incompetence which I go on to discuss.
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she is a normal adult and she was speaking English. Hence, she was following 
certain rules.
Could the internalist say some such thing? That is, could he make out that 
people use language, and hence follow linguistic rules, without having reasons 
for following these rules? The problem is that the internalist cannot do justice 
to the asymmetry between following rules and breaking rules. According to 
the internalist, if someone who does X has no reason for doing X, it is because 
he has no operative desire to do X. This might make room for ‘just following’ 
linguistic rules, but if it does, then it will at the same time make room for ‘just 
breaking’ linguistic rules: if I lack the desire not to break the rules, I cannot be 
deemed irrational when I break them. But misusing language for no reason at 
all is a paradigmatic manifestation of irrationality – while one who ‘systemati-
cally’ misuses language lacks an intellectual and practical capacity (so perhaps 
no more misuses language than does a gurgling baby). Conversely, ordinary 
fluent language use, i.e., following the rules, is a paradigmatic manifestation of 
human rationality.
‘Ceteris paribus, one has reason to follow (not break) the rules governing 
the uses of words’ is true enough. But if there is a ‘Why?’ question correspond-
ing to this truth, it is something like: ‘Why go in for linguistic communication 
at all?’ In response to this question, we can perhaps point to all the many 
benefits of having language, as we can point to the benefits of going in for 
promising. However, it is not as if it is an option for us to give up using lan-
guage; so the form of the question is misleading. It would be better if it were 
rephrased along these lines: ‘What are (some of ) the benefits of having lan-
guage?’ – a question of about the same level of generality as ‘What are (some 
of ) the benefits of being able to move around in space?’
5. Conclusion
Let me summarise these investigations. Understanding language is manifested 
in using language, which is a kind of human activity. In teaching a person the 
meanings of words, we aim to instil in them an ability, but not, typically, a 
mere ability: we aim, in fact, to instil an ability and an inclination – namely, 
to use such-and-such words correctly. (To say this need not be to impute to 
the learner an intention to use those words correctly; that way of putting it is 
probably an over-intellectualisation.) In the specific case of stopping and forc-
ing modals, we additionally aim to instil the inclination to do (or not do) 
whatever is mentioned as what you ‘have to’ or ‘cannot’ do. The criteria for a 
learner’s understanding the meanings of such modals include her often enough 
doing (or not doing) the relevant things. An adult may count as understand-
ing what the modals mean despite having developed an erratic inclination, or 
even disinclination, to do what she is meant to do, etc., on account of (a) the 
default assumption that speakers know the meanings of the words in their 
language, and (b) the existence of criteria for knowing and (more significant-
ly) for not knowing the meanings of words, or not knowing that they apply 
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here. In the absence of any of these latter criteria, the ‘default assumption’ 
(defeasibly) stands.
It is possible for it to become the norm, or at least normal, for people (e.g., 
in some societal group) to fail to respond appropriately to stopping and/or 
forcing modals of one kind or another. The more this is true, the less clear the 
meaning of what they say and do will be. Conceptual corruption and conse-
quent widespread forms of nonsense are humanly possible; Anscombe pro-
posed that this picture in fact held true, at the time when she wrote and at 
least as regards the philosophical community, of such terms as ‘moral obliga-
tion’ and ‘the moral ought’. It seems hard to deny that public discourse offers 
various instances of this sort of linguistic and practical vacuity.
It is natural and tempting to regard thought, will and understanding as 
logically independent of action. The foregoing reflections on the meaning of 
Anscombean modals help to undermine this notion. (They are not the only 
reflections to do so.) Understanding, meaning and action are here closely 
intertwined. An internalist about reasons for action can be seen to buy into 
the mistaken notion of logical independence insofar as he claims (a) that 
rational action can only occur when an agent has a ‘motivating reason’ to do 
something, and (b) that one only has reason to follow a rule or rules insofar 
as doing so is conducive to the satisfaction of one’s standing, or prior, desires. 
But desiring to follow the rule ‘In circumstances C you have to j’ presuppos-
es knowing the meaning of ‘You have to’, ‘C’ and ‘j’. The criteria for under-
standing the meaning of these terms, however, include doing what you ‘have 
to’. Thus desire to follow a rule is here logically posterior to action.
In connection with the rules governing the use of words (symbols), the 
internalist claim founders in dramatic fashion; for it can be said to commit 
the internalist to the nonsensical idea that the relevant desires are independent 
of the agent’s doings even to the extent of those desires’ having ineffable con-
tent – from which it would follow that no distinction could be made between 
what would, and what would not, be conducive to their satisfaction.
In using language, or in having articulate thoughts, one thereby follows 
certain rules and in that sense can be thought of as ‘responding appropriately’ 
to the modal statements expressive of those rules. This is what constitutes the 
rationality of one’s talk or thought; it is not constituted by any conformity of 
rule-following with standing desires.18
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